Structure, Multiplexity, and Centrality in a Corruption Network:The Czech Rath Affair by Diviak, Tomas et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Structure, Multiplexity, and Centrality in a Corruption Network
Diviak, Tomas; Dijkstra, Jan Kornelis; Snijders, Tom A. B.
Published in:
Trends in Organized Crime
DOI:
10.1007/s12117-018-9334-y
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2019
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Diviak, T., Dijkstra, J. K., & Snijders, T. A. B. (2019). Structure, Multiplexity, and Centrality in a Corruption
Network: The Czech Rath Affair. Trends in Organized Crime, 22(3), 274–297.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-018-9334-y
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Structure, multiplexity, and centrality in a corruption
network: the Czech Rath affair
Tomáš Diviák1,2,3 & Jan Kornelis Dijkstra1 &
Tom A. B. Snijders1,4
Published online: 22 March 2018
# The Author(s) 2018, corrected publication May/2018
Abstract The present study is an analysis of a Czech political corruption network known as
the Rath affair reconstructed with publicly available data. We argue that for the study of
criminal networks it is fruitful to follow a multiplex approach, i.e., to distinguish several
interdependent network dimensions and study how they are interrelated. Relational elements
in corruption are identified, and we propose three dimensions that are essential for under-
standing the Rath network: pre-existing ties (e.g., marriage or co-membership of the same
party), resource transfer (e.g., bribing), and collaboration (e.g., communication). The aim of
the study was threefold. We aimed to examine if the network exhibits the core/periphery
structure, to investigate themultiplex structure of the network by assessing the overlap of the
main dimensions of the network, and to determine the central and multiplex actors while
considering the differentiation of centrality according to the three network dimensions. The
core/periphery model appears to have a perfect fit to the aggregated network, leading to a
four-block adjacency matrix. Studying the frequency of ties in these blocks shows that
collaboration ties are present in all the blocks, while resource transfer ties are mainly located
between the core and periphery, and pre-existing ties are rare generally. We also identify
central actors, none of which are strategically positioned, occupying more visible positions
instead. The majority of actors display strong multiplexity in the composition of their own
ties. In the conclusion the potential usefulness of multiplex descriptive measures and of
mixed methods approaches, implications of our results for trust incriminal networks, and
potential merits of analytical sociology approach are discussed.
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In the last decade, there has been a growing interest in covert and criminal networks.
Particular attention has been paid to terrorist, smuggling, and trafficking networks
(Morselli 2009; van der Hulst 2011). In comparison, corruption networks have gained
far less attention in research and have been generally understudied. However, the
consequences of corruption in terms of security, trust, welfare and justice warrant a
closer look to understand how corruption is structured and organized.
In this study, we examine a case of a corruption network with a specific focus on the
structure of the network, multiplexity of relations (i.e., the existence of several different
types of ties between actors), and centrality of actors. Specifically, we applied social
network analysis (SNA) to a case of political corruption in the Czech Republic, known
as the Rath affair, reconstructed with publicly available data, resulting in a small network of
11 persons, who were involved in large scale abuse of EU subsidies, bribery, and
manipulation of public contracts. We analyze the overall structure of the network, the
multiplexity of ties in this structure, and the centrality of actors. We investigate how certain
micro-level features (overlapping of multiple types of ties and activity of individual actors)
bring about macro-level outcomes, in this case the overall structure of the network
(Coleman 1990; Hedström 2005).
Corruption
Corruption is generally defined as an Babuse of public power for private gain^
(Funderburk 2012; Silitonga et al. 2016; Uslaner 2008). While this general definition
of corruption does not entail any particularly relational or interactional features,
corruption as a phenomenon consists of a wide range of activities and some of them
are intrinsically relational. For instance, bribery and blackmailing are based on a
transfer of various resources, which are either offered or demanded in return for a
desired service. Another form of corruption involving transfer or exchange of resources
is the so-called kickback, which is a term for illegal provision of a public contract,
which is Bkicked^, i.e., boosted, to provide a share for the corrupted official. Nepotism
and cronyism are based on pre-existing relationships with relatives or friends respec-
tively, who are installed into influential or well-paid positions despite their incompe-
tence. Although these are just the most common forms of corruption, there are more
activities which could be labelled as such (for a detailed description, see Silitonga et al.
2016). What is shared by all the mentioned forms of corruption, however, is that these
activities take place in human interactions and relationships.
Although some corruption involves just the exchange between two individuals in
cases of abusing a single opportunity (Granovetter 2004; Uslaner 2008), there is also a
type of corruption that disproportionately enriches a small number of rich and influen-
tial actors from the public as well as private sector. This form of corruption, labeled as
grand corruption, involves far greater flows of financial resources or their material and
immaterial equivalents, giving rise to severe envy, mistrust and perception of social
inequalities (Uslaner 2008).
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The danger of grand corruption lies in its potential for sophisticated collaboration
and coordination among multiple actors, who can act in an organized manner to
maximize their profit and minimize their risks. Such conspiracies of multiple individ-
uals acting in concert to reach illegal goals are cases of organized crime (Albanese and
Reichel 2014; Paoli 2014). This cooperation creates a network of transfers and rela-
tionships among these actors. To such structures of joint activities, social network
analysis can be applied as an analytical tool apt to capture the underlying organizational
principles (van der Hulst 2009). Here, we focus on the overall structure of the network
and the way it is constituted by multiplex relations and by the activity of the individual
actors involved.
Core/Periphery structure
Research on criminal1 networks has generated a considerable body of knowledge
(Carrington 2011; Gerdes 2015b; Morselli 2009; 2014a, b; Oliver et al. 2014). One
network concept is especially relevant in the context of criminal networks: the so-called
core/periphery structure (Borgatti and Everett 1999). Networks displaying this structure
are composed of two sets of nodes. The core is a densely interconnected group of
nodes, whereas the periphery is a set of nodes with ties to the core, but few or no ties
within the periphery. This structure has been described in a variety of empirical
networks, such as economic networks and international trade, formal organizations,
scientific citations or even animal collectives (ibid.). Borgatti and Everett (1999)
developed a formal way of examining the core/periphery structure, by trying to find
the optimal partition of the node set reflecting the division in core and periphery. This
optimal partition is then compared to the ideal core/periphery structured network with
the same number of nodes and their similarity yields a measure of goodness of fit.
In criminal settings, features indicative of the presence of the core/periphery struc-
ture have been described in a number of cases, such as several Spanish cocaine
trafficking networks (Gimenéz Salinas-Framis 2011), the Turkish terrorist organization
Ergenekon (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012), price fixing conspiracies in electrical industry
(Baker and Faulkner 1993), and the Watergate conspiracy (Faulkner and Cheney 2013).
Most of these studies did not formally fit the core/periphery structure to the available
data; an exception is the study of the inner circle of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (Stevenson and Crossley 2014). We follow a similar approach in modeling the
network. In the case of corruption networks, a core/periphery structure resembles the
structure of patron/client relationships, which are often thought to be the basis for
political corruption with mutually beneficial quid-pro-quo exchanges between politi-
cians (patrons – the core) and their supporters (clients – the periphery; della Porta and
Vanucci 2012; Funderburk 2012; Granovetter 2004). Consequently, the first research
question is to what extent does the corruption network in this study resemble a core/
periphery structure?
1 Several different terms can be used for labelling this type of networks such as dark networks (Milward and
Raab 2006), illicit networks (Bouchard and Amirault 2013), criminal networks (Morselli 2009, 2014a) or
covert networks (Oliver et al. 2014; Stevenson and Crossley 2014). We use the term criminal here as it is clear
and relates to the organized crime.
276 Trends Organ Crim (2019) 22:274–297
Multiplexity in criminal networks
Social relationships are often based on more than one dimension, for instance, two
individuals may be friends and co-workers simultaneously. Multiplex2 networks de-
scribe multiple relationships among the same set of actors (Hanneman and Riddle
2005). The analysis of multiplex instead of simplex3 networks provides a more realistic
and more detailed picture of social reality and in turn deepens the understanding of the
network under scrutiny (Bright et al. 2015; Faulkner and Cheney 2013; Gerdes 2015a;
Hamill et al. 2008; Kivelä et al. 2014). Despite the attention to multiplexity in criminal
networks given in the literature, starting already quite some time ago (Ianni 1972;
Krohn et al. 1988), in many studies the relational information has been aggregated to a
single network, without specifying the content of the relation, or of the exchanges
taking place. The reason is the paucity of available information, so that the researcher
already has made progress when there is evidence for at least some relationships
between pairs of actors. However, multiplexity is a key component of the dyadic level
of analysis in the network perspective (Robins 2009). Organized crime is in principle
an embedded and multiplex phenomenon, created by individuals nested within multiple
social relations held together by information, activities, obligations, and exchanges
(Papachristos and Smith 2014). Distinguishing between these relational contents is
essential for understanding criminal activities and how networks play a role in their
organization. Papachristos and Smith (2014) suggest that multiplexity of relations is an
important factor in illegal settings where it compensates for the lack of formal institu-
tions. Therefore, when going more deeply in the explanation and analysis of the social
organization of crime, a differentiation between different types of relations is important.
There are some published examples of multiplex criminal network analyses. Most
prominently, a study by Krebs (2002) of the 9/11 terrorist attacks followed the example
of overt organization analysis in mapping different types of ties, resulting in four types or
dimensions; trust, tasks, money & resources, and strategy & goals. Another example is
Faulkner and Cheney (2013) study of theWatergate conspiracy, where they distinguish five
separate dimensions, emphasizing negative ties of enmity among actors, which could have
been a stronger cause of eventual collapse of the conspiracy than an external disruption. In
a study by Everton (2012) on the Indonesian terrorist network ofNoordinMohammadTop,
trust (friendship, kinship or shared affiliation) and operational ties (communication, financ-
ing, common training) were distinguished. Papachristos and Smith (2014; 2016) analyzed
a large network of criminal and legitimate actors surrounding the infamous gangster Al
Capone, resulting in three types of relations; criminal, personal (e.g., kinship) and legal
(e.g., non-criminal cooperation). Bright et al. (2015) base their analysis on the concept of
tangible (e.g., money or material) and intangible (e.g., skills or information) resource
transfers among co-offenders in the case of drug smuggling. They also underline the
importance of multiplexity by warning for potentially misleading results of simplex
analysis of aggregated networks as thismay lead to over- or underestimation of prominence
of individual actors. For example, an actor may be central in one dimension but peripheral
2 Multiplex networks are sometimes referred to as multivariate, multidimensional or multirelational, which are
different from multilevel networks or multilayer networks.
3 For traditional networks with just one relation among nodes, the terms simplex, monoplex, or uniplex may
be used.
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in others, incorrectly making him seem unimportant in the overall aggregated simplex
network. Finally, a review by Gerdes (2015a) described ten possible dimensions; direct
operational links, logistic links, planning links, financial links, training links, ideological
links, family, friendship, enmity and uncertain links.
Based on the previous research described above, we propose three dimensions. For
each dimension, we provide a brief description, the content of ties, and a justification
for its inclusion.
1) Pre-existing ties. There has been a great emphasis on the importance of trust within
covert networks (Erickson 1981; Krebs 2002; Milward and Raab 2006; Oliver et al.
2014; Robins 2009; van der Hulst 2011). By trust, we mean the expectation of
reciprocation and of not defecting, that is, not breaking the concealment, in a covert
environment (further see Campana and Varese 2013; von Lampe and Ole Johansen
2004). Pre-existing ties, meaning ties established before the criminal act itself, may be
crucial sources of trust, which makes their analysis important (Morselli and Roy
2008). Specifically, pre-existing ties may take a form of kinship relations, friendships,
or relations based on shared ideology or shared affiliation to the same organizations or
institutions. Therefore, they are to a large extent overt, unlike the other types of ties
presented below. In our case, pre-existing ties include marriage, being university
classmates, and mutual membership in a board of directors of a company. However,
it is important to acknowledge that the presence of such a tie does not automatically
create trust between the two connected actors, and a pre-existing tie may only
potentially facilitate a creation of a tie of another type; but we have no other
information about trust between these individuals. The question is, to what extent
was the criminal cooperation backed up by pre-existing ties. Ties in this dimension
capture the notion of Krebs’ (2002) and Everton’s (2012) dimension of trust,
Papachristos and Smith (2014; Smith and Papachristos 2016) personal ties and partly
legal ties and Gerdes’ (2015a) links of training, ideology, family and friendship.
2) Resource transfer. Resource transfer or exchange (if reciprocated) is the main compo-
nent of numerous forms of organized criminal activity. It includes the transfer of illegal
profits obtained. Resources to be transferred may be both material and immaterial,
tangible (e.g., equipment) as well as intangible (permissions, skills; see Bright et al.
2015). This dimension covers the logistic, training, planning and financial links pro-
posed by Gerdes (2015a). In our case, the main transferred resources are money in the
form of bribes or kickbacks for politicians and manipulated contracts for businessmen.
3) Collaboration. Ties in this dimension can be broadly defined as purposeful interactions,
involving communication that can be both direct (face-to-face) and indirect (e.g., phone
calls, e-mails). This dimension also includes collaboration on tasks or co-appearance at
the same time in relevant places, which is consistent with the task and strategy and goals
networks in the concept of Krebs (2002), operational ties as defined by Everton (2012),
and the criminal dimension of Papachristos and Smith (2014; 2016).4
4 In order to distinguish between the dimensions of collaboration and resource transfer, we consider an
interaction to be a tie in the resource transfer dimension if it involves any transfer of resources. In order to be a
tie in the dimension of collaboration, the interaction has to include any sign of collaboration different from a
transfer of resources.
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For each of these three dimensions there could be negative ties, as in some cases,
animosity or even outright enmity may exist among actors (Faulkner and Cheney 2013;
Gerdes 2015a). These dimensions also allow tie weights to be taken into account. They
also allow the specification of the direction of ties as directed or undirected based on the
source of the data and the accuracy and detail of their recording. This framework is
sufficiently general and flexible, which makes it potentially applicable to other cases of
corruption networks. As will be mentioned below, in the analysis presented in this
paper, we do not consider negative, directed, or weighted ties.
We examine different ties to assess the multiplexity in the corruption networks in this
study. In amultiplex network, some dimensionsmay tend to overlap with other dimensions
and this may also differ between the core and the periphery. Hence, the second research
question is how do different types of ties overlap in the aggregated network?
Central actors in criminal networks
The analysis and identification of central actors is a crucial task for explanation of the
structure of the criminal network, as it is the individual level where the intentionality (e.g.,
intention to remain covert or to maximize profit) resides (Robins 2009). Organizing
activities of central actors have been related to the organization of the whole group, fostering
its ability to adapt to a changing environment and to profit or survive in the face of
disruption (see e.g., Bright et al. 2012; Morselli 2009; Oliver et al. 2014). Centrality is a
concept which captures to which extent the actor is connected to many others, or connects
many others, and thusmay be influential for the organization of the entire group. In the core/
periphery structure, central actors are those in the core. Centrality of actors in the network
can be measured in different ways (Freeman 1978). Two of the most commonly used
measures are degree and betweenness.5 Whereas degree is a simple count of all ties of a
node, betweenness captures the number of shortest paths between other pairs of nodes on
which the actor stands, enabling to bridge different segments of the network. Actors with
high betweenness, so-called brokers, are considered crucial in keeping the network con-
nected (Morselli and Roy 2008). Degree and betweenness express the concept of centrality
in quite distinct ways, and they do not necessarily correlate. It has been shown that in some
cases leaders in criminal networks may hide in the background by having a low degree, as
having high number of ties is easily detectible and thus vulnerable. By contrast, they
compensate by having a brokerage position (a high betweenness score). Morselli (2010)
calls this ‘strategic positioning’. In addition, there may be three more types of actors
depending on their degree and betweenness. Actors with low values for both degree and
betweenness are marginal in the network. Actors with a low betweenness but a high degree
are more visible and therefore more at the risk of detection. Finally, actors with high values
on both indices are highly central and as such visible. Even though they have a high
betweenness, this potential advantagemay be outweighed by the risks of high degree (ibid.).
The concept of centrality is more complicated when taking multiplexity into account.
Battiston et al. (2014) point out that nodes may differ in terms of how dispersed their ties
are between different dimensions of a multiplex network. They theorize three possible
5 For more in depth introduction to SNA and its methods, see for example a recent textbook by Borgatti et al.
(2013).
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types of nodes in this regard. Focused nodes have ties in only one dimension and thus are
unconnected in others. Multiplex nodes have ties spread evenly across all the dimensions.
Lastly, mixed nodes have ties in multiple dimensions, yet their dispersion across them is
uneven, that is, they havemore ties in one dimension compared to other dimensions (ibid.).
We combine this approachwith the strategic positioning introduced above. By doing so,
we can identify central actors and take multiplexity of their ties into account. Some actors
may be central in one dimension, but marginal in other dimensions, suggesting speciali-
zation in the network in a certain task, while being marginal in others (Bright et al. 2015).
Other actors may occupy average or even marginal positions in terms of centrality in each
dimension separately, but may be crucial by integrating different layers of the network into
one single coherent whole due to multiplex spread of their ties.
Hence, the third research question is which actors are central in the corruption
network and how do centralities of actors differ across network dimensions?
Case description - the Rath affair6
In this study we analyze a political corruption scandal from the Czech Republic. The
analyzed case consists of actors involved in an affair surrounding a long-term contro-
versial figure of Czech politics – David Rath,7 a former minister of health, at the
outbreak of this scandal a social democratic party (CSSD) deputy and governor of the
Central Bohemia region. David Rath was arrested the 14th of May 2012 by anti-
corruption police together with his close colleagues and two lovers, Petr Kott and
Katerina Pancova, in the midst of being bribed. The main reasons for their arrest were
embezzlement, kickbacks, abuse of EU subsidies, and manipulation of public contracts,
mostly in the domain of hospital equipment and public estates reconstructions (e.g.,
chateaus or schools). As the investigation continued, it turned out that these three
persons were not alone in their offences and another eight persons were arrested as
well, mainly managers of firms involved in manipulated contracts or profiting on the
abused subsidies. Together, these 11 actors were systematically cooperating on embez-
zlement, manipulation of contracts and abuse of EU subsidies and they mutually shared
the profits of their action. The financial damage reached at least twenty million Czech
crowns (almost one million Euros). Hence, this case matches the definition of grand
corruption and organized crime presented above, as it entails both collaboration of a
group of offenders and a large amount of transferred resources.
In order to alleviate otherwise severe problems of boundary definition in criminal
networks, we adopted a nominalist approach (Borgatti et al. 2013, p. 33–34). The
criterion for including an actor into the network is based on criminal justice circles (see
Morselli 2009, p. 44–45). We define the criminal justice circle for the Rath affair as
Bbeing charged^, including as a node in the network everyone who was charged with
any criminal act in connection to this affair. This resulted in the following eleven actors;
6 For more information on this affair, see e. g. (both in Czech): http://www.lidovky.cz/infografika.
aspx?grafika=korupcni-kauza-davida-ratha (Lidovky.cz 2016) or: http://zpravy.idnes.cz/soud-s-davidem-
rathem-05r-/krimi.aspx?c=A130806_141944_krimi_klm(iDNES.cz 2013)
7 Czech names usually contain letters with diacritics such as „áB, „šBor „čB. In order to be consistent with the
visualizations, which are made with a software package not supporting such letters, we do not include them in
the text.
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David Rath, − governor of the Central Bohemian Region and a deputy of the social
democratic party (CSSD);
Petr Kott, Katerina Pancova (after marriage - Kottova) – a politician (CSSD) and his
wife and the director of Kladno city hospital;
Pavel Drazdansky, Lucia Novanska, Martin Jires, Ivana Salacova, Tomas Mlady,
Vaclav Kovanda, Jindrich Rehak, Jan Hajek – managers and representatives of various
construction or medical equipment providing firms.
Methods
Data collection and coding
One of the most challenging tasks in research on covert networks is the collection of data
(Morselli 2014b; van der Hulst 2009). Bright et al. (2012) compared five different data
sources: offender databases, transcripts of physical or electronic surveillance, summaries of
police interrogation, transcripts of court proceedings and online or print media. Apart from
online or print media, most data sources are not publicly or freely accessible.
An objection against using online or print media is their lower validity, as they are
always a secondary source of information dependent on the perspective and knowledge
of the journalists, who produce it. This also limits researchers’ options to control their
quality and credibility. Another possible pitfall of media-based data is the tendency of
journalists to focus on what or who they deem to be interesting and, consequently,
focusing their reports on specific persons, making the data derived from these reports
centralized as a result. Nevertheless, if the reported information is sufficiently detailed
and carefully processed, it may yield meaningful results (see e.g., Athey and Bouchard
2013; Bright et al. 2012; Krebs 2002; Milward and Raab 2006; Silitonga et al. 2016).
However, it is important to keep the limitations of the data in mind when interpreting
the results and drawing conclusions.
In our study, we rely on online and print media as a data source. We extracted the data
from a Czech media database called Newton Media Search, searching for online or print
articles containing the names of each pair of actors simultaneously (e.g., BDavid Rath^
AND BPetr Kott^ or BDavid Rath^ AND BLucia Novanska^ and so on) and also for
Bkauza Rath^, which is the Czech name of the analyzed case. We then sorted out 20 most
relevant articles for the whole case as well as for each pair of actors (based on the Newton
Media Search criterion called relevance) from the period from 2011 to 2015 (i.e., from a
year prior to the outbreak of the scandal), resulting in a total of 240 unique articles.8 We
have checked all these reports. In case there was a statement about a connection between
any of the involved actors, we saved the source as well as the exact wording of the
statement. After deletingmultiplicities, for instance multiple mentions of Kott and Pancova
being in an intimate relationship, we ended up with 49 records of ties between the actors,
which is the total number of ties for all dimensions in the network.
8 The total number of articles searched this way was 1120 (20 articles for 55 pairs of actors and 20 articles for
the case as a whole), but due to overlap between the articles, some of the articles were found repeatedly. For
example, a review article on the case contained Bkauza Rath^ and it also contained the names of each of the 11
actors and thus it appeared in results for the search for each pair (55 times) and in the search for the whole case
(once). Hence, the number of unique papers is 240.
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Subsequently, we coded all ties into the three dimensions: pre-existing ties, resource
transfer, and collaboration, based on their content. All coding was again conducted by a
second, independent researcher. Only three ties were coded differently, which were then
recoded based on mutual agreement between coders. Therefore, we consider the coding
to be reliable.
Measures
Pre-existing ties are relations based on shared affiliations of actors (e.g. being members
of the same party or of the directorial board of the same company) or their mutual
involvement in a personal relation (e.g. being married or being university classmates).
Resource transfer ties were derived from information about bribing, kickbacking or
placing a manipulated contract between the actors. Collaboration ties were coded
accordingly when two actors were reported to be meeting together, communicating
with each other or cooperating on a certain task.
Because the pre-existing ties dimension is based on shared attributes or similarities
between actors, this dimension is undirected by definition. Although ties in the resource
transfer and collaboration dimensions can be thought of as directed, we decided to code
these ties as undirected due to insufficient information about the direction of ties. Specif-
ically, the data sources were rarely detailed enough to specify the direction of ties, for
instance, who called whom or who encouraged a personal meeting with whom. Rather,
these interactions are typically simply described as just happening, e.g. person A and
person B met each other or were in contact with each other. Similarly, in some cases of
resource transfer, it is possible to distinguish who bribes whom, but in other cases such as
sharing profit from a manipulated contract, the direction is indistinguishable. The same
reasoning leads to considering all ties as binary (i.e., absent or present) rather than weighted
as detailed information about frequency of collaboration or volume of resource transfers is
rarely, if ever, specified. Thus, all three dimensions are undirected and binary.
Analytic strategy
To obtain a first view of the network, the multiplexity is provisionally left out of
consideration and these several dimensions are aggregated into a single simplex
network. We aggregated the dimensions with the use of logical expression of union
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005). This means that if there is a tie between two actors in at
least one of the dimensions, then it exists in the aggregated network. This yields an
aggregated network where ties represent any connection between the actors. This gives
us a picture of the overall network structure. Subsequently, we decompose the aggre-
gated network by looking at each dimension separately.
First, we describe all the three dimensions and the aggregated network by the
number of participating (connected) nodes, number of ties, density, centralization,
average degree and its standard deviation, average geodesic distance and diameter,
using corresponding computations in the UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) software and
the statnet (Handcock et al. 2003) package in R.
In order to answer the first research question concerning the core/periphery structure, we
fitted the ideal core/periphery model to the data and compared its fit using the categorical
core/periphery routine in the UCINET software package (Borgatti and Everett 1999). Put
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simply, this attempts to optimally partition nodes into two sets (i.e., core and periphery) and
simultaneously uses (dis)similarity measures (e.g., correlation or Hamming distance) to
show the goodness of fit of the empirical data to the ideal model, in which the core is a
complete graph (a clique) and periphery is an empty graph. A good fit indicates that the
observed network exhibits the core/periphery structure. We ran the routine with varying
starting configurations in order to see if the resulting solution is robust.
To answer the second research question, about the multiplexity of ties, we analyzed
overlapping ties between dimensions in two steps. First, we calculated similarities between
the dimensions. For this purpose, we computed the Jaccard coefficients for each pair of
dimensions, which is a ratio of ties being present in both compared networks to the number
of ties present in at least one of them. This is 1 if the networks are identical and 0 if they
have no ties in common. Second, we analyzed the overlap of ties in a similar way as Bright
et al. (2015). We used the multiplexity coder function in the UCINET, which assigns
different codes to each different combination of dimensions between each pair of actors.
This allows us to see which dimensions overlap between which nodes.
For the third research question, about centrality andmultiplexity of the individual actors,
we first computed the standard degree and betweenness centrality measures. Degree of a
node is a simple count of all adjacent nodes. Betweenness of a node is the proportion of
shortest paths between all other nodes that include the given node. In order to identify
strategic positions, we also calculated means of both these measures. Following the same
procedure as Morselli (2010) and Bright et al. (2015), we then deem nodes strategically
positioned if their betweenness value is higher than the mean value and degree value lower
than the average. Subsequently, we term actors with below average betweenness and above
average degree as Bvisible^. Actors with values for bothmeasures exceeding their mean are
called Bcentral^. Lastly, those with both values below the mean are labeled as Bmarginal^.
In the second step, we computed the multiplex participation index (further see Battiston
et al. 2014). Essentially, this index measures how ties of a node vary across different
dimensions and is standardized with values ranging between 0 (absence of multiplexity
with concentration of ties in one dimension) and 1 (perfect multiplexity with ties equally
spread across all dimensions). If this range is divided into thirds, then the lower third values
belong to uniplex or focused nodes, middle range values cover mixed nodes and the
highest values reflect multiplex nodes (ibid.).
Visualization
As is usual in SNA, we use sociograms to visualize our network. The inclusion of
multiplexity calls for some adjustments. We decided to adopt the visualization strategy
for multiplex networks proposed by Kivelä et al. (2014). Their idea is to visualize the
aggregated network first, save coordinates of the nodes in the aggregated network and
then visualize each dimension separately with nodes anchored in these coordinates.
This allows for easy visual comparisons between different dimensions and is less
cluttered than visualizing all the dimensions in one graph with the use of different line
colors or line types. Concerning the analysis of overlap, we decided to visualize the
result using the well-known Venn diagram, which is suitable for capturing overlapping
sets of objects (see e.g., Papachristos and Smith 2014).
We also present a permuted core/periphery matrix as a result of the model fitting. It
is an adjacency matrix rearranged in such way that nodes belonging to the core are
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grouped together and nodes belonging to the periphery are also grouped together. These
two groups are just visually distinguished by a dividing dashed line drawn in the
matrix. For networks with small number of nodes, this is clear and offers the advantage
to closely inspect particular ties or actors.
In order to display the strategic positioning, we also use a scatterplot of degree and
betweenness with dashed lines representing the means of both these measures (Bright
et al. 2015; Morselli 2010). This divides the graph into four parts corresponding to the
Bstrategically positioned^, Bvisible^, Bcentral^ and Bmarginal^ types of actors.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all the three dimensions and the aggregated network
(see also Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4). Note the absence of average geodesic distance and diameter
for the pre-existing ties network. Both measures are based on path lengths and connectivity
of the network, but this particular network is disconnected and most of the shortest path
lengths are undefined (or infinite) as a result, making it meaningless to include these
Table 1 Network descriptive statistics for all dimensions and the aggregated network
Network descriptives
Network Nodes Ties Density Avg degree SD degree Centralization Avg geodesic Diameter
Aggregated 11 32 0.58 5.82 2.75 0.51 1.42 2
Pre-existing ties 11 5 0.09 0.91 1.04 0.26 – –
Resource transfer 11 15 0.27 2.73 1.56 0.28 2.12 4
Collaboration 11 24 0.44 4.36 2.46 0.44 1.66 3
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Note: size of a node according to its degree; triangles represent politicians/officials
Fig. 1 Aggregated network
calculations. This is the least dense and the least centralized dimension. It is also the only
dimension inwhich some nodes do not participate (have no ties). There are five such nodes.
The densest and most centralized dimension is collaboration. The high density reflects the
small number of nodes, but the average degree indicates frequent activity of actors in this
dimension. Centralization is high in the collaboration dimension, suggesting that all the
activities were concentrated around a few influential actors. This makes the network
effective in terms of cooperation due to good flow of information, yet vulnerable due to
potential disintegration with removal of central actors. The resource transfer dimension is
less dense and less centralized than collaboration. It has also longer geodesic distances on
average. Nevertheless, all nodes are connected in this dimension, but due to lower average
degree and longer distances, the flow of resources is less cohesive than collaboration. It is
also worth mentioning that aggregating all the ties does not lead to dispersion or lesser
centralization for the actors but even stronger centralization. Therefore, the network as a
whole is neither polycentric (centralized around a few different locally central nodes) nor
flat (with evenly spread centralities), which is consistent with findings from other studies
(e.g., Varese 2012).
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Fig. 2 Pre-existing ties dimension network
Fig. 3 Resource transfer dimension network
Core/Periphery
To answer our first research question about the core/periphery structure in the network,
we fitted the ideal core/periphery matrix with the observed aggregated matrix and then
looked at their correlation. This correlation was 1.0, showing that this network exhibits
a perfect core/periphery structure. This is also shown in the permuted core/periphery
matrix (Table 2). We see that indeed the core is fully connected, and the periphery is an
empty graph. Further, no periphery member is connected to all core members. The core
is composed of, first, the three politicians, Rath, Kott and Pancova, who were handing
over all the corrupted contracts. Kott and Pancova are the only actors who are
connected to all others in the network. The three were helped in manipulating these
contracts by another member of the core – Novanska. The remaining two actors from
the core are the most central managers, Drazdansky and Salacova, who were frequently
286 Trends Organ Crim (2019) 22:274–297
Fig. 4 Collaboration dimension network
Table 2 Permuted core/Periphery matrix
Permuted core/periphery matrix
actor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 David Rath 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 Petr Kott 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 Lucia Novanska 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Katerina Pancova 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Pavel Drazdansky 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Ivana Salacova 1 1 1 1 1 1
7 Martin Jires 1 1
8 Tomas Mlady 1 1 1 1 1
9 Vaclav Kovanda 1 1 1
10 Jindrich Rehak 1 1 1 1
11 Jan Hajek 1 1 1
connecting other actors from the core and from the periphery and cooperated on more
than one manipulated contract with other members of the core (Denik.cz 2013;
parlamentnilisty.cz 2013). The periphery consists of the remaining businessmen, who
(unlike Drazdansky and Salacova) were involved in criminal activities only occasion-
ally or ad hoc in order to exploit a single opportunity for kicking a contract or
participating in a manipulated competition. This interpretation substantively validates
this partition of the core and periphery as there is a clear dividing line between densely
interconnected and active actors in the core and marginal actors in the periphery with
only connections to the core. In corruption networks, politicians and officials who are
in possession of demanded services and power, may become highly attractive and/or
active and thus central. This is a mechanism of generalized social selection, where
individuals with certain qualities tend to occupy adequate structural positions within the
network (Robins 2009). This gives rise to the centralized network structure. In this case,
the core has more members than the periphery, contrasting to what is mostly seen for
core/periphery structures. We do not know if this is a true characteristic of this case; it is
also possible that the periphery is larger and contains some more individuals, as yet
undetected. It is also important to note that the perfect core/periphery structure in this
case may be to some extent an artefact of the media-derived data. Specifically, there
might be some ties missing among the peripheral actors in the network as a result of the
Bspotlight effect^ (Smith and Papachristos 2016), that is, disproportionate attention of
journalists towards the core actors of the case. However, because the core is so dense,
the overall core-periphery would still be present, albeit not in perfect form, even if there
were some ties present among the peripheral actors.
Multiplexity
As it can be seen in Table 3, the low values of Jaccard coefficients reveal that the three
different dimensions do not overlap very much. The sparseness of pre-existing ties leads
especially to low Jaccard coefficients for this network. In order to disentangle the overlap
between dimensions, it is necessary to analyze the patterns of overlaps more closely.
Results of this analysis are shown in the Table 4 and depicted in a Venn diagram (Fig. 5).
In total there are 55 dyads, pairs of actors, in the overall undirected network. These
55 dyads can be arranged into 8 different types based on their composition, that is, from
empty null dyads to fully multiplex dyads containing a tie of each dimension and every
possible combination in between (Fig. 5). 23 of all dyads are null, having no ties at all.
The majority of the present ties are uniplex (20 out of 32, i.e., 62,5%), which
corresponds with previous research findings (Bright et al. 2015; Papachristos and
Smith 2014; Smith and Papachristos 2016). Even though there are only five ties overall
in the pre-existing ties dimension, none of them is uniplex. This means that ties in this
Table 3 Jaccard coefficients for
multiplex ties overlap
1 2 3
1 Pre-existing ties –
2 Resource transfer 0.05 –
3 Collaboration 0.16 0.22 –
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dimension are not functional by themselves, but rather serve as a basis or facilitation for
ties in other dimensions, mostly (four of them) in the collaboration dimension.
On the contrary, collaboration was possible to be carried out mostly without a
combination with any other type of tie. In seven dyads, it was also accompanied by
transferred resources. Pure resource transfer without further cooperation or communi-
cation, and not combined with pre-existing ties, appeared in seven instances. Lastly,
there is no fully multiplex dyad in the network. This together with the low number of
pre-existing ties means that the dimensions of collaboration and resource transfer are
vital to the functioning of the network as a whole, while the role of pre-existing ties is in
reinforcing other relations and interactions.
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Table 4 Core/Periphery structure including multiplexity
Core/periphery matrix with dimension overlaps
actor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 David Rath 5 1 5 1 2 4 1
2 Petr Kott 5 4 5 2 2 4 2 1 3 4
3 Lucia Novanska 1 4 4 2 1 2 2 2
4 Katerina Pancova 5 5 4 4 2 1 2 4 1 2
5 Pavel Drazdansky 1 2 2 4 2 5
6 Ivana Salacova 2 2 1 2 2 2
7 Martin Jires 4 1
8 Tomas Mlady 4 2 2 2 5
9 Vaclav Kovanda 1 4 2
10 Jindrich Rehak 1 3 2 1
11 Jan Hajek 4 2 2
Note. 1 = only resource transfer; 2 = only collaboration; 3 = pre-existing ties 
& resource transfer; 4 = resource transfer & collaboration; 5 = collaboration
& pre-existing ties
Fig. 5 Venn diagram of dimension overlaps
Additional analyses
As an additional step, we combined the dimension overlaps with the core/periphery
structure of the network. This shows which of the overlapping ties fall into the core,
which into the periphery, and which cross between them. Table 4 shows all tie overlaps.
First of all, the pre-existing ties are not exclusively located only in the core block –
three of them are, but the remaining two are located in the core/periphery block.
Although these ties link some of the important figures in the core, there is no evidence
that these ties are exclusive to the most central actors. Specifically, some of the most
central actors are not connected in this dimension (Novanska and Salacova) and other
core members are, but there are also some peripheral actors participating in this
dimension (Rehak and Mlady).
Collaboration ties are evenly spread across the network segments – exactly half of
them are located within the core and the other half is a part of ties between core and
periphery. However, this is not true for the dimension of resource transfer. Exactly two
fifths of these ties (40%) are a part of relations between the core actors, whereas the
remaining 60% of resource transfer is going on between core and periphery nodes. This
further supports the theoretically expected notion of patron-client relationships (della
Porta and Vanucci 2012; Funderburk 2012; Granovetter 2004), where patrons provide
Bfavors^ for clients in return for their support or resources. Therefore, even though we
don’t have directionality of ties, we can say who is a patron and who is a client based
on actors’ network position and their attributes. High density of collaboration among
patrons in this regard may be explained as mutual attempts to strengthen their position
and to protect themselves. It is also indicative of their organizing and coordinating
efforts in terms of the activity of the whole group.
The overall core/periphery structure thus is built up from a dense collaboration
within the core and a slightly sparser collaboration between the core and the periphery.
Table 5 Centrality measures
Actor Degree Betweenness Participation
David Rath 7 0.95 0.96
Petr Kott 10 9.12 0.93
Lucia Novanska 8 2.62 0.72
Katerina Pancova 10 9.12 0.88
Pavel Drazdansky 6 0.2 0.86
Martin Jires 2 0 0.42
Ivana Salacova 6 1 0.67
Tomas Mlady 5 0 0.67
Vaclav Kovanda 3 0 0.75
Jindrich Rehak 4 0 0.84
Jan Hajek 3 0 0.56
Mean 5.82 2.09 0.75
Standard deviation 2.75 3.56 0.17
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The collaboration is cemented with the resource transfer between the members of the
core and periphery, in accordance with the notion of patron-client relationships. While
pre-existing ties reinforce other relations, they are not necessary for them – only a
handful of resource transfer or collaboration ties were underlined by them. The
multiplex overlap of collaboration and resource transfer is an important building block
of the macro-structure.
Centrality measures
Table 5 shows the degree and betweenness of each actor in the aggregated network
together with their multiplexity participation index. Surprisingly, Rath himself is not
the most central actor in the overall network. The most central actors in terms of
both degree and betweenness are the married couple Pancova and Kott, followed by
Novanska. Kott and Pancova were behind all the manipulated contracts and bribes,
which is reflected by their degree of 10. This means they have a tie in at least one
dimension to every other actor in the network. Novanska was involved mainly
because of her expertise in handling and corrupting contracts (Lidovky.cz 2014).
The eponymous actor, Rath, was very well informed and consulted by Kott and
Pancova, but this couple also took care of the majority of all the work (Lidovky.cz
2013). This probably also explains why they are more central and arguably also
more important for integration of the group as a whole. Less central positions are
held by managers and businessmen. This is quite logical, as they were mostly
involved ad hoc for one specific task or contract. Furthermore, all the peripheral
actors have a betweenness of zero, which is in fact a consequence of a perfect core/
periphery structure.
The role of Rath begs the question whether he is strategically positioned within
the network or not. As it turns out, there is neither a strategically positioned actor
(with above average betweenness and below average degree) nor any actor close
to being strategically positioned. The two centrality measures are highly correlated
(r = .85), indicating that nodes are either central in both measures or not. This
implies considerable visibility of central actors and thus also high exposure and
the risk of detection.
The analysis of multiplexity of ties of each actor complements this picture. Overall,
none of the actors is uniplex or focused. On the contrary, the majority of actors is
multiplex as indicated by the multiplex participation index which exceeds the value of
0.66. On the one hand, with the highest values of this index, ties of Rath and Kott span
Table 6 Positioning and multiplexity
Multiplexity
Positioning Multiplex Mixed Focused
Central 3 0 0
Strategically positioned 0 0 0
Visible 3 0 0
Marginal 3 2 0
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across all dimensions and thus these actors bring the network together. On the other
hand, Hajek and Jires are the least multiplex nodes. They are the only nodes with mixed
ties and they also have low overall degree.
To gain further insight, we also combined the centrality measures with this
multiplexity measure. Combinations of positions and multiplexity of nodes in the
network are shown in Table 6. As we have already stated above, nodes are neither
focused nor strategically positioned. The three multiplex and central nodes are Kott,
Pancova and Novanska. They are the most active actors and furthermore, they are
active across dimensions. Another set of three nodes are those, who are highly visible
(high degree) and multiplex. This set consists of the remaining actors from the core
Rath, Drazdansky and Salacova, although Salacova’s multiplex participation index is
borderline (= 0.67). The last set of nodes is composed of the five marginal actors from
the periphery of the network, who are either multiplex or mixed in terms of their
multiplexity. In general, the centrality measures further confirm the fact that the
network is core/periphery structured with the core consisting of politicians and officials,
and the periphery of business people. All the central actors exhibit a strong tendency
towards multiplexity, yet none of them exhibits tendencies towards the security of
strategic positioning (Fig. 6).
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Note: The dashed lines represent the means of the variables. Kovanda with Hajek and 
Pancova with Kott share the same data point as they have the same scores in both measures.
Fig. 6 Positioning of actors
Discussion
One question arising from our analysis is related to the theoretical discussion about the
importance of trust in organized crime and covert networks. While the dimension of pre-
existing ties − which in the literature is supposed to be the basis for trust − underlies and
reinforces other types of ties, in the Rath case it seems very sparse, and dissimilar to other
dimensions. Thus, our findings suggest that this criminal network operated without being
firmly based on pre-existing ties, which contradicts results or assumptions of other
researchers (e.g., Erickson 1981; Krebs 2002; van der Hulst 2011; Battiston et al.
2014). Which other bases for trust are there in the absence of pre-existing ties?
Campana and Varese (2013) mention, for example, third party enforcement, cutting of
options to defect, taking hostages, or threat and potential use of violence. For cases like the
one studied here, the influence of third parties and cutting of the options by knowing about
illegal deeds of others come to mind as ways to enforce cooperation and to prevent
defection. Alternatively, von Lampe and Ole Johansen (2004) show cases where there is
no fundamental need for trust at all in order to cooperate in criminal networks and
defection is considered as a real possibility. Such cases may be for example purely
risking the cooperation in adverse conditions with no feasible alternatives, or just
accepting the possibility of others defecting as a natural or even thrilling part of the
criminal activity. One especially important base for trust is worthmentioning in the light of
other findings of our study. Smith and Papachristos (2016) argued that it is in fact the
overlapping of multiple types of ties which builds trust and reduces uncertainty among the
offenders in the network by rooting the relation in multiple bases. So in cases where pre-
existing ties are not extensive, overlapping of resource transfer and collaboration may
possibly be a mechanism compensating for the lack of pre-existing ties or other trust-
enhancingmechanisms. If two actors engage in a lot of common activities, theymay lose a
lot by defecting in one of them. However, thesemodes of cooperation as well as the role of
trust itself need to be further empirically investigated.
Another question arises from the results about the core/periphery structure of the
network. Why did these persons act in a way that made their interactions so centralized
and frequent, even though this was dangerous as it made the network vulnerable to the
disruption in the core? From the network point of view, none of the actors tried to reduce
the risk by seeking a strategic position, that is, by minimizing redundant connections. Of
course, it is highly problematic to assume that actors themselves actually think about their
activities in network terms, but they are still able to reflect upon their actions and tell
whether they are not Btaking it too far .^ One possible explanation for this may be their
reliance on their elite membership status (Demiroz and Kapucu 2012) such as being an
official or a politician (for instance, Rath had the deputy immunity9). This elite membership
status in turn led actors to foster a belief and a strong confidence that they might not be
arrested or even investigated at all (ihned.cz 2013). The core-periphery structure has an
important implication for the disruption of such corruption networks. While actors in the
coremay be easier to detect, it is necessary to capture all themembers of the core in order to
effectively incapacitate the network, because all the members of the core are structurally
equivalent and thus a single removed actor may be quickly replaced by another one.
9 In the Czech Republic, deputies are protected by the law from being arrested or sentenced unless they are
caught immediately after committing a crime.
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However, such network interventions should always take the shortcomings of the data into
account. For example, prior to the intervention, the results obtained from one data source
should ideally be triangulated with data obtained from other sources.
An interesting point connected to the Bvisible^ actors is the fact that it allowed the
police investigators and law enforcement representatives to take the advantage and
make two crucial steps in the investigation – arresting Rath red-handed while taking a
bribe, and later turning Salacova to become a star witness and subsequently provide
critical evidence in the trial (ihned.cz 2013). We suppose this was enabled by the highly
visible positioning of these two actors within the network. Because of their high degree,
the role of Rath was easily traceable and Salacova could provide essential information
about other actors in the network.
Conclusion
The goal of this study of a Czech political corruption network was to understand its
structure by focusing on its characteristics as a multiplex network, distinguishing the
three network dimensions of collaboration, resource transfer, and prior existing ties.
Specifically, we aimed at answering three interconnected research questions – whether
the network has a core/periphery structure, how the multiplex dimensions overlap in its
structure, and which actors are central in the network. First, the aggregated network
exhibits a perfect core/periphery structure with all the involved politicians located
within the core, and businessmen in the periphery. Second, ties in the collaboration
dimension are evenly split between the core block and core-periphery block, while
resource transfer ties are mostly located between core and periphery. The dimension of
pre-existing ties is very sparse and all of the pre-existing ties are combined with at least
one of the other dimensions. Most of the ties are either collaboration or resource
transfer, not both; not a single tie covers all three dimensions. Last, there is a clear
distinction between prominent and marginal actors, but none of the more prominent
actors occupies a strategic position in the sense of trying to hide by minimizing
redundant connections. A vast majority of actors are multiplex in terms of spread of
their ties across multiple dimensions.
We reviewed previous studies which employed the notion of multiplexity in
covert settings. The findings of these studies together with ours show that the
multiplex point of view may reveal important information. However, this gives
rise to the question why there are not more studies of criminal networks highlight-
ing multiplexity. This may be on the one hand due to difficulties of data avail-
ability and data validity. In the context of criminal networks, it is much more
difficult to distinguish several network dimensions, because it is already so
difficult just to determine if there is a tie or not in the first place (Gerdes
2015a). Most research about criminal networks is data-driven (Bright et al.
2012; Carrington 2011), and if the available data do not allow to specify different
dimensions of interaction, the multiplex analysis is simply impossible to be carried
out. The other reason may be a lack of suitable methods for description of
multiple dimensions simultaneously – while conceptually and computationally
more elaborated network analysis methods such as Exponential Random Graph
Models (Robins et al. 2007) or Stochastic Actor-oriented Models (Snijders et al.
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2010) have their extensions to multiplex data, simple descriptive measures such as
centrality or cohesion measures for multiplex networks are in their Binfancy^
(Kivelä et al. 2014). And since the field of covert and criminal network analysis
is mostly based on these more simple measures (probably because of unfamiliarity
with statistical models as well as theoretical interest in network description; see
Campana 2016), the possibility to include the aspect of multiplexity into the
analysis might have been overlooked. We believe that the multiplex participation
index of Battiston et al. (2014) and the dimensions overlap analysis are two of
such potentially fruitful measures for description of multiplex networks.
An evident difficulty for our approach is data quality and reliability, as data on
covert networks are in principle impossible to collect by standard means of observation
or questionnaires. Thus, a researcher in this area is left to rely upon other sources of
data, which may vary in their availability and validity (Bright et al. 2012). We have
used publicly available open-source data from media. Clearly, data obtained from this
source suffer from problems with validity and reliability. Therefore, the results should
be taken with a grain of salt, as there may be some information missing. As was already
pointed out above, such missing information may to some extent alter the results. In
order to make the most of the available information, it is necessary to process the data
carefully. We performed a content analysis with pre-specified coding categories.
Content analysis not only fulfils requirements for careful data processing with its
reliability check (see also Stevenson and Crossley 2014), van der Hulst (2009) also
recommends content analysis as a suitable complement to SNA in criminal networks
research, because it allows taking a more detailed look at the data and thus gaining
more solid understanding of the studied case and its context and make the interpretation
more valid (further see e.g., Campana and Varese 2012; Natarajan 2006). We
complemented our quantitative findings with qualitative insights based on our content
analysis. From this point, one possible extension for this research could be to incorpo-
rate qualitative methods even more with a fully mixed-methods design. Qualitative
analysis allows to derive the meaning from the network or as Stevenson and Crossley
(2014) aptly expressed it – if network analysis captures the structure, then qualitative
methods complement it by capturing the agency.
Related to the discussion of proper methods for the analysis of multiplex criminal
networks is the issue of theory-building to surpass the lack of feasible theoretical
explanations in the field (Carrington 2011; van der Hulst 2011). The case presented in
this study was analyzed with mechanism-based explanations in mind. This can be
elaborated in further research. Mechanism-based explanations have been pioneered
within analytical sociology (Hedström 2005; Hedström and Bearman 2011) and this
analytical approach to the explanation of organized crime may be of good use to
criminology. The mechanism approach seeks to explain a social phenomenon by
identifying a constellation of entities and activities, typically actors and their actions,
that are linked to one another in such a way that they regularly bring about the type of
phenomenon in question (Hedström 2005, p. 2). There is an evident synergy between
this approach and SNA, as they both are concerned with actors and their relations.
Furthermore, analytical sociology explicitly relies on actor-oriented explanations
(ibid.), which counterbalances the overemphasis on network topology in the analysis
of criminal networks (Robins 2009). A synthesis of these approaches may help the
field of criminal networks studies both in theorizing as well as in modelling. This
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study shows that looking at mechanisms such as multiplex overlap of ties is an
important factor in explaining the structure of criminal networks and may help to
advance our understanding of corruption.
Funding Work on this paper was partially funded by a contribution from Hlávkova nadace and by
internal student grant “Networks of organized crime” awarded to the main author by the Faculty of Arts
of Charles University in Prague.
Compliance with ethical standards
Ethical approval This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by
any of the authors.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Albanese JS, Reichel PL (eds) (2014) Transnational organized crime: an overview from six continents. SAGE
Publications, Inc., Los Angeles
Athey NC, Bouchard M (2013) The BALCO scandal: the social structure of a steroid distribution network.
Global Crime 14(2/3):216–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2013.790312
Baker WE, Faulkner RR (1993) The social Organization of Conspiracy: illegal networks in the heavy
electrical equipment industry. Am Sociol Rev 58(6):837–860
Battiston F, Nicosia V, Latora V (2014) Structural measures for multiplex networks. Phys Rev E 89(032804).
https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.89.032804
Borgatti SP, Everett MG (1999) Models of core/periphery structures. Soc Networks 21(4):375–395.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-8733(99)00019-2
Borgatti SP, Everett MG, Freeman LC (2002) UCINET 6 for windows: software for social network analysis.
Analytic Technologies, Harvard
Borgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Johnson, J. C. (2013). Analyzing social networks. SAGE publications
Bouchard M, Amirault J (2013) Advances in research on illicit networks. Global crime. Retrieved from
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17440572.2013.801316
Bright D, Hughes C, Chalmers J (2012) Illuminating dark networks: a social network analysis of an Australian
drug trafficking syndicate. Crime Law Soc Chang 57(2):151–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-011-
9336-z
Bright DA, Greenhill C, Ritter A, Morselli C (2015) Networks within networks: using multiple link types to
examine network structure and identify key actors in a drug trafficking operation. Global Crime 16(3):
219–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2015.1039164
Campana P (2016) Explaining criminal networks: strategies and potential pitfalls. Methodological Innovations
9:1–10. https://doi.org/10.1177/2059799115622748
Campana P, Varese F (2012) Listening to the wire: criteria and techniques for the quantitative analysis of
phone intercepts. Trends Organized Crime 15(1):13–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-011-9131-3
Campana P, Varese F (2013) Cooperation in criminal organizations: kinship and violence as credible
commitments. Ration Soc 25(3):263–289. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463113481202
Carrington PJ (2011) Crime and Social Network Analysis. In: The SAGE Handbook of Social Network
Analysis ,vol 2011, pp 236–255
Coleman J (1990) Foundations of social theory. Belnap Press, Cambridge
Demiroz F, Kapucu N (2012) Anatomy of a dark network: the case of the Turkish Ergenekon terrorist
organization. Trends Organized Crime 15(4):271–295. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-012-9151-7
Trends Organ Crim (2019) 22:274–297 295
Denik.cz. (2013) Kauza Rath: Stavební manažer Kovanda popřel úplatek 2,8 milionu. Retrieved November
29, 2016, From http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/soud-dokonci-vypovedi-11-obzalovanych-v-kauze-
davida-ratha-20130829.html
iDNES.cz. (2013) Tlačenice, špitání s právníky, čtení obžaloby. Začal soud s Rathem - iDNES.cz. Retrieved
November 29, 2016, From http://zpravy.idnes.cz/soud-s-davidem-rathem-05r-/krimi.aspx?c=
A130806_141944_krimi_klm
Erickson BH (1981) Secret societies and social structure. Soc Forces 60(1):188–210
Everton SF (2012) Disrupting dark networks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Faulkner RR, Cheney ER (2013) The multiplexity of political conspiracy: illegal networks and the collapse of
Watergate. Global Crime 14(2–3):197–215. https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2013.790313
Freeman LC (1978) Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Soc Networks 1(3):215–239.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(78)90021-7
Funderburk C (ed) (2012) Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective: Sources, Status and Prospects
(new edition edition). Routledge, Burlington
Gerdes LM (2015a) Dark dimensions: classifying relationships among clandestine actors. In: Illuminating dark
networks: the study of clandestine groups and organizations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp
19–38
Gerdes LM (2015b) Illuminating dark networks: the study of clandestine groups and organizations.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Gimenéz Salinas-Framis A (2011) Illegal networks or criminal organizations: power, roles and facilitators in
four cocaine trafficikng structures. Universidad Autonóma de Madrid
Granovetter M (2004) The Social Construction of Corruption. Deprtment of Sociology, Stanford University.
Retrieved from https://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/4117/The_Social_Construction_of_Corruption_Oct04.pdf
Hamill TJ, Deckro RF, Chrissis JW, Mills RF (2008) Analysis of Layered Networks. IOSphere,pp 27–33
Handcock MS, Hunter DR, Butts CT, Goodreau SM, Morris M (2003) statnet: Software tools for the
Statistical Modeling of Network Data. Retrieved from http://statnetproject.org
Hanneman R, Riddle M (2005) Introduction to Social Network Methods. Retrieved April 3, 2016, from
http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/
Hedström P (2005) Dissecting the social: on the principles of analytical sociology, 1st edn. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Hedström P, Bearman P (eds) (2011) The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology (1 edition). Oxford.
Oxford University Press, New York
van der Hulst RC (2009) Introduction to social network analysis (SNA) as an investigative tool. Trends
Organized Crime 12(2):101–121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-008-9057-6
van der Hulst RC (2011) Terrorist networks: the threat of connectivity. In: The SAGE handbook of social
network analysis, pp 256–270
Ianni FAJ (1972) A family business: kinship and social control in organized crime. Russell Sage Foundation,
New York
ihned.cz. (2013) Bradáčová, Pancová, Kott, Řehák. Podívejte se, kdo je kdo v Rathově korupční kauze.
Retrieved November 29, 2016, From http://domaci.ihned.cz/c1-59638040-kdo-je-kdo-v-rathove-kauze
Kivelä M, Arenas A, Barthelemy M, Gleeson JP, Moreno Y, Porter MA (2014) Multilayer networks. J
Complex Networks. https://doi.org/10.1093/comnet/cnu016
Krebs V (2002) Uncloaking terrorist networks. First Monday, 7(4). Retrieved from http://firstmonday.
org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/941
Krohn MD, Massey JL, Zielinski M (1988) Role overlap, network multiplexity, and adolescent deviant
behavior. Soc Psychol Q 51(4):346–356
von Lampe K, Ole Johansen P (2004) Organized crime and trust: on the conceptualization and empirical
relevance of trust in the context of criminal networks. Global Crime 6(2):159–184. https://doi.org/10.1080
/17440570500096734
Lidovky.cz. (2013) Jak se uplácelo v kauze Rath. Obžaloba odhaluje zločineckou symbiózu | Domov.
Retrieved November 29, 2016, From http://www.lidovky.cz/jak-se-uplacelo-v-kauze-rath-obzaloba-
odhalila-zlocineckou-symbiozu-115-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A130417_161021_ln_domov_ogo
Lidovky.cz. (2014) Obžalovaná v kauze Rath mění advokáta. Jako jediná dosud nevypovídala | Domov.
Retrieved November 29, 2016, From http://www.lidovky.cz/novanska-v-kauze-rath-meni-advokata-jako-
jedina-dosud-nevypovidala-1d1-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A140911_155036_ln_domov_spa
Lidovky.cz. (2016) Infografiky - Lidovky.cz. Retrieved November 29, 2016, From http://www.lidovky.
cz/infografika.aspx?grafika=korupcni-kauza-davida-ratha
Milward HB, Raab J (2006) Dark networks as organizational problems: elements of a theory. Int Public
Manag J 9(3):333–360. https://doi.org/10.1080/10967490600899747
296 Trends Organ Crim (2019) 22:274–297
Morselli C (2009) Inside Criminal Networks (Vol. 8). Springer New York, New York
Morselli C (2010) Assessing vulnerable and strategic positions in a criminal network. J Contemp Crim Just
26(4):382–392. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986210377105
Morselli C (2014a) Crime and networks. Routledge, New York
Morselli, C. (2014b). Introduction. In Crime and Networks (pp. 1–9). Routledge
Morselli C, Roy J (2008) Brokerage qualifications in ringing operations. Criminology 46(1):71–98. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2008.00103.x
Natarajan M (2006) Understanding the structure of a large heroin distribution network: a quantitative analysis
of qualitative data. J Quant Criminol 22(2):171–192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-006-9007-x
Oliver K, Crossley N, Everett MG, Edwards G, Koskinen J (2014) Covert networks: structures, processes and
types. The Mitchell Center for Social Network Analysis working paper. Retrieved from http://www.
socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/research/mitchell/covertnetworks/wp/working_paper1.pdf
parlamentnilisty.cz. (2013) Drážďanský: Cítím se nevinen, výpověď Salačové je účelová. Retrieved
November 29, 2016, From http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Drazdansky-Citim-se-nevinen-
vypoved-Salacove-je-ucelova-283474?beta=error
Paoli L (ed) (2014) The Oxford handbook of organized crime, 1st edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Papachristos AV, Smith C (2014) The embedded and multiplex nature of al Capone. In: Crime and networks.
Routledge, New York, pp 97–115
della Porta D, Vanucci A (2012) The hidden order of corruption: an institutional approach. Farnham: Ashgate.
Retrieved from https://www.routledge.com/The-Hidden-Order-of-Corruption-An-Institutional-
Approach/Porta-Vannucci/p/book/9780754678991
Robins G (2009) Understanding individual behaviors within covert networks: the interplay of individual
qualities, psychological predispositions, and network effects. Trends Organized Crime 12(2):166–187.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-008-9059-4
Robins G, Pattison P, Kalish Y, Lusher D (2007) An introduction to exponential random graph (p*) models for
social networks. Soc Networks 29(2):173–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2006.08.002
Silitonga MS, Anthonio G, Heyse L, Wittek R (2016) Institutional change and corruption of public leaders: a
social capital perspective on Indonesia. In: Decentralization and governance in Indonesia. Springer,
Berlin, pp 233–258
Smith CM, Papachristos AV (2016) Trust thy crooked neighbor Multiplexity in Chicago organized crime
networks. Am Sociol Rev 81(4):617–643. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416650149
Snijders TAB, van de Bunt GG, Steglich CEG (2010) Introduction to stochastic actor-based models for
network dynamics. Soc Networks 32(1):44–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2009.02.004
Stevenson R, Crossley N (2014) Change in covert social movement networks: the ‘inner circle’ of the
provisional Irish republican Army. Soc Mov Stud 13(1):70–91. https://doi.org/10.1080
/14742837.2013.832622
Uslaner EM (2008) Corruption, inequality, and the rule of law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Varese F (2012) The Structure and the Content of Criminal Connections: The Russian Mafia in Italy. Eur
Sociol Rev. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcs067
Trends Organ Crim (2019) 22:274–297 297
